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Political power, economic freedom and performance in the Tunisian 
banking sector :  literature and empirical validations  
 
Abstract : 
Over the past decades, the banking sector has undergone tremendous transformation, and its performance is 
subject to increasingly important factors. Among these factors, political power and economic freedom which are 
the subject of our paper. This paper presents a theoretical examination of the fundamentals and the intervention 
mechanisms of political power. Then a presentation of the different perceptive of economic freedom and the 
different dimensions of banking performance. Finally, an empirical study is to settle down for the Tunisian 
banking sector, first by a descriptive study then an econometric study. An econometric analysis using panel data 
by the Generalised Least Squares  (GLS) method was carried out,   on a sample that covers 6 Tunisian commercial 
banks, three state-owned banks and three private banks that account for 70% (= 68.8%) of  the outstanding 
deposits. The banks studied are banks listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (BVMT). Our sample therefore 
includes the main commercial banks in Tunisia during the period 2008-2018. The dependent variable retained in 
our model is the return on assets “ROA”. This variable presents the bank’s performance in our paper  and we 
will be testing the effect of both political power and economic freedom on it. We empirically confirm the 
existence of an important relationship between political power and the performance of Tunisian banks. Indeed, 
banking performance improves by the decrease of political power existence d in the sector. On the other hand, 
we empirically demonstrated that economic freedom has no significant effect on banking performance in 
Tunisia. But it remains important to point out the existence of a strong significance between banking 
performance and other variables of the chosen econometric model hence the need for further academic work. 
Keywords: Bank Performance, Economic Freedom ; Political Power  
JEL Classification : G18  G21 
Paper type: Empirical research 
 
Résumé : 
Au cours des dernières décennies, le secteur bancaire a subi des transformations considérables et sa performance 
devient de plus en plus dépendante des plusieurs facteurs. Parmi ces facteurs, le pouvoir politique et la liberté 
économique qui font l'objet de notre article. Cet article présente un examen théorique des fondamentaux et des 
mécanismes d'intervention du pouvoir politique. Puis une présentation des différentes perceptions de la liberté 
économique et des différentes dimensions de la performance bancaire. Enfin, une étude empirique est mise en 
place pour le secteur bancaire tunisien, d'abord par une étude descriptive puis une étude économétrique. Une 
analyse économétrique à partir de données de panel par la méthode Moindres carrés généralisés (MCG) a été 
réalisée , sur un échantillon couvrant 6 banques commerciales tunisiennes, trois banques publiques et trois 
banques privées qui représentent 70% (= 68,8%) de l'encours des dépôts. Les banques étudiées sont des banques 
cotées à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Tunis (BVMT). Notre échantillon comprend donc les principales 
banques commerciales en Tunisie au cours de la période 2008-2018. La variable dépendante retenue dans notre 
modèle est le rendement des actifs «ROA». Cette variable présente la performance des banques dans notre article 
et nous allons tester l'effet du pouvoir politique et de la liberté économique sur notre variable. Nous confirmons 
empiriquement l'existence d'une relation importante entre le pouvoir politique et la performance des banques 
tunisiennes. En effet, la performance bancaire s'améliore par la diminution du pouvoir politique dans le secteur. 
D'un autre côté, nous avons démontré empiriquement que la liberté économique n'a pas d'effet significatif sur la 
performance bancaire en Tunisie. Mais, il reste important de souligner l'existence d'une forte significativité entre 
la performance bancaire et les autres variables du modèle économétrique choisi d'où la nécessité de poursuivre 
les travaux académiques. 
Mots clés : Performance bancaire ; Liberté Economique ; Pouvoir Politique 
Classification JEL:  G18 ; G21  
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1. Introduction  
The bank is certainly a powerful political tool, regardless of profitability. Throughout our 
history, banks have proven to be an influential instrument, public or private. Also cited is The 
House of Medici, the largest bank in Europe in the 15th century, ruled Florence, due to its 
monopoly position in Vatican banking, and produced four popes of the Catholic Church. In 
1917, Lenin used the banking system as the "skeleton of a socialist society" which also 
represents the predominant role of financial intermediation. Lavezzolo (2020) 
On the other hand, by examining the relationship between political risk and banking 
stability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Al Shboul, Maghyereh, Hassan, 
and Molyneux (2020) support the hypothesis of financial fragility and they suggest that 
political risk influences the level of stability of conventional and Islamic banks in a politically 
unstable region for nearly a century. Thus, in a Chinese context, politically connected boards 
of directors exert a significant influence on credit risk. Evidence shows that the type of bank 
ownership moderates the link between politically connected advice and credit risk. Boateng, 
Liu and Brahma (2019). In another context, Nitish Kumar (2019) provides evidence of a real 
cost of political interference on banks. By analyzing the elections in India, he shows that the 
political power manifested by the granting of preferential loans to politically important sectors 
can lead to a costly crowding out of real activity in other productive sectors. As for crises, 
Chen, Liao, Lin and Yen (2018) show that public banks with politically connected CEOs 
experienced significantly higher credit default rates and poorer operating performance during 
the financial crisis of 2007- 2009. However, these CEOs were less likely to be penalized for 
their banks' poor performance.  
On the other hand, several authors find that economic freedom is increasingly important in 
banking performance. Aziz and Knutsen (2019) indicate that greater economic freedom 
positively influences the profitability of the Arab banking sector by referring to a banking 
sector that is characterized by a positive behavior in the region despite that the growth rates of 
deposits in a number of Arab countries weakened (following a downward trend in world oil 
prices over the past decade). Thus, in a Chinese context, economic freedom takes on 
importance through its effect on banking efficiency, which involves reducing public spending, 
leading to a drop in aggregate demand and demand for credit moderating. Yap and Sufian 
(2018) Furthermore, the relationship between banking performance and economic freedom is 
the subject of several studies. Al Amarneh and Yaseen (2017) suggest, in the Jordanian 
framework, that there is a clear relationship between the financial counterparts of indices of 
economic freedom and banking efficiency.  
In this framework of analysis it is important to study how a banking environment 
characterized by a degree of economic freedom as well as a climate of political power 
influences the performance of a bank? 
Our study is structured as follows. The next section relates this study to the existing 
literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 includes the methodology adopted while 
section 4 presents different results and discussion. Finally, the last section summarizes our 
study and concludes this paper. 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses  
Political power as one of the elements influencing the economic environment is being a 
subject of literature that looks at its effects on banking performance. Indeed, political risk 
certainly affects banking risk, mainly through government uncertainties and increased 
information asymmetries. (Al Shboul, Maghyereh, Hassan and Molyneux - 2020). Ashraf 
(2017) also argues that political risk effect banking risk taking through the quality of legal 
institutions and competition from the banking sector.  
According to Loncarski and Marinc (2020), bankers should be wary of discretionary 
lending powers. However, discretion allows manipulation by politicians who seek to gain 
power over the bank lending. Protectionist political forces that lead to less competition and 
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tighter borders could weigh more heavily on banking relationships, especially within large 
multinational banks. 
Indeed, the exercise of political power in the banking sector can take many forms. 
- Firstly, the interventions of the public authorities to guarantee the stability of the 
banking sector which is subject to political interests. For example, politicians postpone 
government intervention in failed banks during election years (Brown and Dinç, 2005). 
- Second, ruling politicians may favor one group of banks over another (for example, 
state banks over private banks or domestic banks over foreign banks, by imposing high 
taxes or requiring the holding of public debts (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2010).  
- Third, politicians impact bank lending policies to reap private benefits (Chen, Hasan, 
Lin and Yen, 2015), such as influencing companies to move employment in politically 
important regions (Carvalho, 2014) or by granting loans during election years. (Dinç, 
2005) 
Moreover, political power acts on banking intermediation margins according to the work of 
Lavezzolo (2020). He notes that banks' financial intermediation margins are lower in 
autocracies than in democracies. His results show that being in an autocracy implies lower 
bank margins following an analysis of the impact of banking competition. Likewise, he asserts 
that the margins of large banks are lower in autocracies than in democracies due to political 
power.  
Furthermore, Holcombe (2020) suggests that  when economic and political power are held 
by the same part, the result is stagnation; when those who hold economic power are not the 
same as those who hold political power, the result is progress. And he adds that the remarkable 
increase in prosperity the world has experienced since the start of the Industrial Revolution a 
few hundred years ago has been the result of the separation of economic power from political 
power.  
On the other hand, one of the factors that can affect the functioning and performance of 
banks is economic freedom. Economic freedom and the freedom of private property rights can 
influence the quality of financial institutions such as banks. (Abolfazl and Hanieh -2013) 
In fact, the results of Aziz and Knutsen (2019) suggest that less regulatory oversight allows 
banks to engage in diversified activities and generate income from non-traditional sources. The 
results also show that the size of banks has a positive and significant impact on profitability: 
banks that are relatively large in the Arab region benefit from economies of scale.  
Also, Sufian and Habibulla (2010) find that overall economic freedom has positive effects 
and a statistically significant impact on the profitability of Malaysian banks; and that overall 
economic and business freedoms have positive effects on the profitability of the Chinese 
banking sector. 
In the other hand, Al Amarneh and Yaseen (2017) show (by efficiency scores obtained 
using the DEA technique between years 2005-2015) that following the financial crisis of 2008, 
increased government intervention had a negative impact on the efficiency of the Jordanian 
banking sector. But, the results of Gwartney, Lawson and Hall (2012) indicate that greater 
economic freedom is associated with a lower probability of a banking crisis. This is the 
opposite of what may well be conventional wisdom and they defend that greater economic 
freedom makes banking crises less likely. 
Therefore, this paper concerns the study of the influence of the level of economic freedom 
as well as political power on the performance of a bank in Tunisia. Therefore, this impact is 
mainly dealt with by variables relating to banking performance, economic freedom and 
political power. In this context, the hypotheses to be tested are those which verify the existence 
or absence of an impact of economic freedom and political power on the performance of 
Tunisian banks. 
In this case, the hypotheses of our research are testing the links between economic freedom 
and bank performances in Tunisia are: 
H1.A. Economic freedom influence banking performance 
H2.A. Economic freedom does not influence banking performance 
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Thus, the hypotheses of our research are testing the links between political power and 
bank performances in Tunisia are: 
H1.B. Political power influence banking performance 
H2.B. Political power does not influence banking performance 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Research model  
Our econometric model below retains political power and economic freedom as 
independent variables to highlight their effects on banking performance represented by the rate 
of return on invested assets ROA.  
 
ROAit = β0 + β1 economic freedom i, t-1 +β2 sizei, t-1 +                                                  
β3 Book-to-market i, t-1+β4 capital ratio i, t-1 + β5 Non performing loansi,t-1+ 
∑βs Status + ∑βs Power + Ɛi 
 
(1) 
The dependent variable retained in our model is the return on assets “ROA”. This variable 
is calculated by: 
• The ratio between net income and total assets 
• Multiplying the net margin by the turnover of assets 
This is a variable that provides information on the average profit generated by each unit of 
assets. Therefore, the “ROA” is an indicator of the efficiency with which a bank is managed. 
(Petersen and Schoeman - 2008) 
For the independent variables, the economic freedom is the index provided by the World 
Bank, the size is measured by the natural log of one plus total assets divided by 109. Book-to-
market is computed by the ratio of total assets to the market value of firms. Capital ratio is the 
ratio of total equity to total assets. Non-performing loans is measured by the natural log of one 
plus the loans 90+ days late and total loans not accruing divided by 109. We then include the 
binary variables status and power. 
3.2. Data and Sample 
Data used in the empirical study was extracted from income statements, bank annual reports 
and bank reference notes.  
The documents used are taken from the financial market council (CMF), the database of the 
Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT), the official websites of the banks as well as data from the 
Tunisian Stock Exchange (BVMT). 
Our sample will cover 6 Tunisian commercial banks, three public banks and three private 
banks , the aim of which is to avoid difficulties due to lack of homogeneity.  
The banks studied are banks listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (BVMT). The numbers 
of banks chosen as well as the study period are subject to availability, reliability and data. Our 
sample therefore includes the main commercial banks in Tunisia during the period 2008-2018. 
There for, the study concerns the following banks: 
• Arab Tunisian Bank (ATB) 
• The Tunisian Bank Company (STB) 
• International Union of Banks (UIB) 
• BH Bank (BH) 
• International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BIAT) 
• National Agricultural Bank (BNA) 
In fact, the above banks account for 70% (= 68.8%) of outstanding deposits.( According to 
the research review of Intermediary in Tunisian Stock Exchange “Tunisie Valeurs” - October 
2018) 
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4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
For our descriptive analysis, we start with the analysis of the mean, the standard deviation, 
the maximum and the minimum of the different variables of our study model; presented in 
Table 1.  
According to the results presented in Table 1, it can be seen that the average return on assets 
for the representative banks in the sector is low, with a value equal to 0.811% that tells about 
the inability of Tunisian banks during the period 2008-2018 to mobilize their material and 
immaterial resources to generate profits and achieve the necessary efficiency. 
In addition, the following figure (Fig1) presents the change in the banks' ROA during the 
period 2008-2018. This graph allows us to observe a significant drop in the return on assets in 
2013 for 5 banks, 3 of which are state-owned banks (BNA, BH and STB). In order, BH STB 
and BNA suffered deterioration in value return on assets in 2013, highlighting the difficult 
situation of these banks. Indeed, the state banks in the sample had difficulties in financing the 
economy and playing the role of the financial arm of the state in 2013. On the other hand, 
according to the graph, in 2017 the BNA had the most important return on assets during the 
period among the period, explained by its record net profit of 182 million dinars achieved in 
2017.  
In addition, the assembly of the representatives of the people approved a set of reforms in 
favor of state banks such as the recapitalization in 2015, restructuring, overhaul of their 
governance and full audits by the government in 2013 for these banks. It can also be seen from 
this same graph that BIAT and UIB have always achieved a relatively high and stable return on 
assets. Indeed, they did not undergo significant variations during the period 2008-2018. It is 
also important to note that the UIB went from a lower ROA of the sample in 2008, to a bank 
with a higher return on assets in 2018. In contrast, the ATB went from its favorable position 
with the highest return on assets in the sample in 2008 to the last position in 2018. 
Fig 1: Return on assets 
 
Source: by authors 
 
Referring to Table 1 and to Fig 2, nonperforming loans of banks recorded an upward trend 
in 2011, the date of the Tunisian revolution, with the exception of the UIB which managed its 
bad debts to decrease during the period 2008 and 2018. 
Also we mention the important drop in nonperforming loans for the STB starting from 2014 
to find in 2018 a level of nonperforming loans lower than the initial level (2008) after the 
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Annee
Banque = ATB Banque = BH
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ATB, always keeps its lower level of nonperforming loans, relatively stable during the 
period, while the BNA has the most dangerous level of nonperforming loans at the end of the 
period since 2013.  
Table 1 as well as the Fig 2 gives evidence that private banks still manage to control their 
nonperforming loans levels unlike state owned banks which are still with a high-
nonperforming loans level compared to the Tunisian banking sector. 
According to Table 1, we notice an average for the power variable equal to 0.71 while this 
variable is binary and takes 1 in existence of power, which allows us to conclude that the 
Tunisian banking sector is a sector influenced by political power. 



















Source: by authors 
On the other hand, the book to market ratio variation is shown in Fig 3, where we can see 
the same particular trend variation among all banks. 
 
In fact, the variations in stock market performance indicated by the book to market ratio 
draws 3 distinguish periods: 
• 2008-2010: a phase of growth 
• 2011-2014: phase of strong decline 
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Fig3: Book to market ratio 
 
Source: by authors 
4.2. Qualitative results 
To develop further our study, the analysis of the descriptive results must be accompanied by 
an econometric analysis.  
The results of the Hausman test show a significance level of 0.0307 which is below the 5% 
threshold; and therefore the model retained is a fixed effect model. 
To detect the multicollinearity problem as well as the elimination of the effect of strongly 
correlated variables, we proceed with the correlation matrix presented in Table 2.  
The correlation matrix shows that all correlation coefficients are less than 0.7, so we note 
the absence of a serious problem of collinearity between the independent variables of the 
model. On the other hand, the variance inflation factor (VIF) can detect the degree of 
multicollinearity when the variables are not centered (Freund, Littell and Creighton, 2003) 
The VIF test confirms the previous results of the absence of multicollinearity with a low 
“Mean VIF” and less than 5 (2.19). In this case, the absence of multicollinearity allows us to 
keep all the variables of the model. 
Our chosen model is a fixed-effect model and we will proceed to the analysis by going 
through the OLS estimators. Indeed, we must verify the homoscedasticity and correlation 
assumptions. 
After recovering and generating the residues, we proceed by the Breush Pagan test. The 
results show a significance level of 0.0013 which is below the 5%. Then, a heteroskedasticity 
problem is detected and must be solved. 
Also, the results of the Wooldridge test make it possible to reject the null hypothesis H0 
since the significance level is 0.0303 below the 5% threshold. Then, an autocorrelation 
problem is detected and must be solved. 
All the tests carried out give us the opportunity to identify the characteristics of the 
regression. Indeed, we deal with a fixed-effect model in the absence of multicollinearity and 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. In this case, we switch from 
the ordinary least squares method to the generalized least squares method to solve the different 
issues.  
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3 according to the generalized least 
squares method. The Table 3 summarizes the results of the estimate. 
The model is globally significant and his p value is equal to 0.0000, less than the 5% 
threshold. 
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ROAit = 0.0699 – 0.0019 economic freedom i, t-1 +0.01 size i, t-1 +                             
0.0065 Book-to-market i, t-1 +0. 05  capital ratio i, t-1 -                                     




The economic freedom, nonperforming loans and power, carry coefficients with negative 
signs. Indeed, a negative sign stands for an independent variable that negatively affects the 
dependent variable. As a result, banking performance decreases through the growth of 
nonperfrming loans, the coefficient of economic freedom and the presence of political power 
relative to a bank.  
Table 3 also shows that the Size and Power variables are highly significant with a p value 
equal to 0.000. We then conclude that the hypothesis H1.B is correct; therefore political power 
influence banking performance. 
Thus, the bad debt and capital ratio variables are statistically significant. Therefore, the 
banking performance represented by the ROA variable (return on assets) improves firstly by 
the reduction of political power within the banks and by the increase in the size of the bank 
through its assets (interbank loans, customer loans, stock market portfolios, fixed assets, etc.). 
Second, this performance is improved by the decrease on nonperforming loans and by the 
growth of the capital ratio.  
In contrast, our model shows that economic freedom is not statistically significant. So 
conclude that the hypothesis H2.A is correct; consequently, economic freedom does not 
influence banking performance. 
4.3. Discussion 
This work shows that the Tunisian banking sector is a divided sector ; between both state 
and private ownership banks. This statement is strongly confirmed by the huge post-
revolution (14-01-2011)  lost in return on assets , as a bank performance indicator , for the 
state-owned banks of the sample  .Actually ,this lost on performance  was going along with 
the most important  growth of the nonperforming  loan for the same banks  .  All the 
nonperforming loan growth was a result of the reclassification of loans  showing that a huge 
amount went for the : former president family and related investments, former political 
regime related people,  investments and loans related to government  political strategy and 
investment sectors. Back to the literature , our findings confirms Boateng, Liu and Brahma 
(2019) results in the Chinese context. As a matter of fact , the authors thinks that politically 
connected boards of directors exert a significant influence on credit risk and that the type of 
bank ownership moderates the link between politically connected advice and credit risk. 
These findings,  shows some kind of similarity between the Tunisian and the Chinese banking 
sector in relation to the credit risk and banks ownership. Also with the Indian sector presented 
by Nitish Kumar (2019),  that showed a real cost of political interference on banks, 
manifested by granting of preferential loans to politically important sectors . 
Furthermore , the amazing results from the econometric estimation that  shows a very 
strong signification for political power variable confirms strictly that the political power 
exercise is affecting the bank performance in Tunisia  in all his intervention types mentioned  
earlier by Brown and Dinç (2005),  Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2010) , Chen, Hasan, Lin and 
Yen (2015), Carvalho (2014) and Dinç (2005). 
Also, considering the 2011 revolution  as an economic crisis, our results confirms Chen, 
Liao, Lin and Yen (2018) findings that state owned banks with politically connected CEOs 
experience significantly higher credit default rates and poorer operating performance during 
the financial crisis (sample  from the 2007- 2009 crise ) . 
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In this stage, not only we can confirm the hypothesis H1.B and that political power 
influence banking performance in Tunisia, but we also confirm that the credit risk in a result of 
political power, plays a meaningful role in the bank performance.  
Thus, the nonperforming loans or the bad debts shown to be statistically significant in our 
estimation. Therefore, an important relationship between bank performance and political 
power is put up through credit risk and loans. 
In the other hand, we can’t say much about the economic freedom as it showed to be 
insignificant in the Tunisian context and adopting the hypothesis H2.A.  In fact, the idea 
suggested by Aziz and Knutsen (2019) that less regulatory oversight allows banks to generate 
income can’t be confirmed in our sample , but their results showing  that the size of banks has 
a positive and significant impact on profitability  are confirmed by our econometric 
estimation. 
Indeed, based on our estimations and literature: Banks in Tunisia benefit from economies 
of scale and more the bank’s size is more the bank’s performance gets.    
5. Conclusion: 
This paper has gone through empirical validation of the impact of political power and 
economic freedom of the performance of Tunisian banks over the period 2008-2018. We 
empirically confirm the existence of an important relationship between political power and the 
performance of Tunisian banks. Indeed, banking performance improves by the decrease in 
political power exercised in the sector. 
On the other hand, we empirically demonstrated that economic freedom has no significant 
effect on banking performance in Tunisia. But it remains important to point out the existence 
of a strong significance between banking performance and other variables of the chosen 
econometric model. 
These findings give an idea to our research purpose on how in a banking environment 
characterized by a degree of economic freedom as well as a climate of political power 
influences the performance of a bank. 
Actually, in Tunisian context political power has a negative influence on banking 
performance and the return on assets improves first of all by the reduction of political power 
within banks and by the increase in size of the bank through its different assets. 
Thus, this performance is improved by the reduction of nonperforming loans and by the 
growth of the capital ratio. 
However, it must be taken into account that economic freedom consists of a set of sub 
variables. So, it remains interesting to work more on an empirical investigation which tries to 
determine the links of the various sub-variables of economic freedom with banking 
performance. 
Also, it’s important to say that risk taking is very meaningful in the banking sector and 
adding that factor to a future work can show some interesting results. In this case this work can 
be continued with a simultaneous equation model.  
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Table 1: Descriptive analysis 
Source: by authors 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 







Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.0081182 0.0074637 -0.0296 0.0193 
Economic Freedom 4.062123 0.0201394 4.01998 4.094345 
size 1.975941 0.3478867 1.136139 2.823221 
Book to market 0.0873976 0.0467748 0.0168853 0.1912813 
Capital Ratio 0.0726333 0.0245158 -0.0162253 0.103184 
Nonperforming loans 0.5598573 0.3227622 0.1193871 1.199009 
Status 0.5151515 0.5036001 0 1 














       
Economic-free -0.0398 1     
Size 0.1502 -0.3352 1      
Book-to-M 0.4084 0.1230 -0.1990 1     
Capital-Ratio 0.4539 0.0495 0.2200 0.2887 1    
Nonper-loans -0.2611 -0.1905 0.5217 -0.6388 -0.3074 1   
Status -0.2459 -0.0408 0.2309 -0.5708 -0.1017 0.4552 1  
Power -0.1328 0.0642 0.6119 -0.1331 0.0341 0.5181 0.3701 1 
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Table 3: Estimation results 







Variables Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Nonperforming loans -.0086962 -2.51 0.012 
Capital Ratio 0.0503326 2.00 0.045 
Size 0.0132421 6.83 0.000 
Book to market 0.0065013 0.44 0.662 
Economic Freedom -0.0194839 -1.19 0.234 
Status 0.0011724 1.48 0.139 
Power -0.010046 -5.93 0.000 
Constant 0.0699449 1.03 0.301 
Wald chi2(7) 110.91 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
